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2
Oligopolistic Competition and Enterprise
Innovation: Cuauhtémoc in the Beer
Brewing Industry
The Mexican Beer Brewing Industry Today
Cuauhtémoc and the VISA Group
Cuauhtémoc, the leading beer brewing company in Mexico, is the core
enterprise of the indigenous enterprise group VISA (Valores Industriales,
S.A.), and is affiliated with the group via FEMSA (Fomento Económico
Mexicano, S.A.), one of the intermediate holding companies controlled by
the group.
One outstanding feature of VISA is that it has grown as a family-con-
trolled enterprise. Until the surfacing of the foreign debt problem in 1982, a
predominant portion of its shares had been held by the founding family. More
recently, its ownership and management have become less closed since its
listing on the stock exchange and the equity participation of foreign compa-
nies. As part of its effort to cope with the foreign debt problem, VISA reorga-
nized itself by establishing under itself the intermediate holding company
FEMSA in 1986 and then reducing its shareholdings in FEMSA to 51 per
cent while encouraging nonfinancial holding companies under FEMSA to
bring in the capital participation of foreign companies. VISA and FEMSA
were listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange in 1978 and 1987 respectively,
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and FEMSA on the New York Stock Exchange in 1991 (El Norte, October 8,
1991). These measures have had the effect of lowering the founding family’s
stockholdings. Nonetheless, a considerable portion of VISA’s shares is still
said to be held by Eugenio Garza Lagüera, the third-generation head of the
founding family, and his family.
Another feature of VISA is that as a business group it is very well diversi-
fied. Under the intermediate holding company FEMSA are five holding com-
panies for the divisions of beer, cola, containers, packages and packaging
materials, and a convenience chain store operation; each holding company
supervises the operation of its own business enterprises. Cuauhtémoc is a
business enterprise in the beer brewing division. Cuauhtémoc is a leading
enterprise in the beer brewing industry, and the business enterprises of VISA’s
other divisions also rank among the leaders in their respective industries
(FEMSA 1995, p. 11; Expansión, August 14, 1996, p. 382). In 1991 at the
time banks were privatized, VISA extended its reach into banking when its
major shareholders joined hands with other entrepreneurs and acquired
Bancomer, the second largest bank in Mexico. VISA now has a close con-
nection with the bank through these shareholders. VISA is thus very well
diversified, but the beer brewing division is the group’s mainstay, account-
ing for 47.2 per cent of the group’s entire business earnings in 1994 (FEMSA
1995, p. 13).
The Duopolistic Structure of the Mexican Beer Brewing Industry
Beer production in Mexico is divided more or less equally between
Cuauhtémoc and Modelo. The history of the country’s beer brewing industry
that led to this duopoly has left vestiges on the industry’s present structure.
One is the geographical distribution of beer breweries. These are distributed
across the whole of the country as well as being located in the three major
urban centers of Mexico City, Monterrey, and Guadalajara. There is nothing
unusual about breweries being sited in or near large consumption centers
(Estrada 1957, p. 17); one would expect this. What is noteworthy in Mexico
is that both members of the duopoly have their breweries distributed widely
across the country, although Cuauhtémoc’s plants are relatively more con-
centrated in the northern part of the country while Modelo’s are found more
in the southern part. Taking into consideration transportation costs, it would
be possible, and economically rational, for the two companies to locate their
plants in the north or south and divide the market between them into their
respective spheres of influence. The market had been divided in this manner
until the 1950s. The present geographical distribution of breweries is a result
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of the harsh competition between the two companies which has induced each
to penetrate its rival’s sphere of influence.
Another vestige left by the industry’s history is that both Cuauhtémoc and
Modelo maintain vertically integrated production systems, internally under-
taking all operations from the production of raw materials to the distribution
of the final products. To produce the malt they need, Cuauhtémoc operates
malt plants in Monterrey and in the states of Baja California Norte and Puebla,
while Modelo has two malt plants in Mexico City and one in the state of
Tlaxcala (Asociación Nacional de Fabricantes de Cerveza c1989, p. 8). The
internalized production of malt is a practice common among beer brewers
around the world. What is peculiar to the procurement of raw materials for
beer production in Mexico is that materials other than malt, namely, contain-
ers, bottle caps, labels, packaging materials, etc. are produced internally. For
Cuauhtémoc these materials are supplied by affiliated business enterprises
(FEMSA 1995, p. 60), while Modelo has three subsidiary firms manufactur-
ing labels and cartons, one producing glass bottles, and two others making
bottle caps (BMV 1995, p. 16). The two brewing companies also share a
common feature in the distribution and marketing of their products: they
have their own distribution networks. Cuauhtémoc has depots in more than
600 cities around the country, and operates more than 3,500 trucks to deliver
its products to more than 300,000 sales outlets. Important among the outlets
are convenience stores affiliated with FEMSA (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990,
pp. 82–83). Modelo likewise has a network of warehouses and depots lo-
cated across the country through which it delivers its products by trucks to its
sales outlets (Expansión, March 30, 1994, p. 23). The two companies’ verti-
cally integrated systems, stretching from the production of various raw ma-
terials all the way to the distribution of the final products have been instru-
mental in enabling them to win out in oligopolistic competition.
Formation of an Oligopoly in the Beer Brewing Industry
Figure 2-1 traces the changes in total national beer production during the
period 1925–84. As evident from the figure, output started to increase begin-
ning in the latter half of the 1930s, and the rate of increase gained further
momentum in the latter half of the 1960s. In stark contrast to the increasing
trend of production, the number of beer brewing companies decreased phe-
nomenally from thirty-six companies (with a total of thirty-six brewing plants)
in 1918 (Musacchio 1990, vol. A-D, pp. 342–43) to nine companies (nine-
teen plants) in 1957 (International Brewers’ Directory 1959, pp. 267–68),
then fell further to two companies (sixteen plants) by 1989 (Asociación
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Nacional de Fabricantes de Cerveza c1989, p. 8). The emergence of this
duopoly can be broken down to the following four phases. Phase 1 extends
from 1890, the year Cuauhtémoc was established and a modern beer brewing
industry was born in Mexico, to 1929 when the company began to transform
itself into a producer for the national market. This first phase can be charac-
terized as one in which brewers catering to local markets were established
around the country. As such, it can be called the formative stage of the Mexi-
can beer brewing industry. Phase 2, extending from 1929 to 1957, saw
Cuauhtémoc expand its production network throughout the country, becom-
ing a national producer. Phase 3 extends from 1957 to 1985. In 1957
Cervecería Moctezuma began to expand its production bases into several
states; Modelo followed suit several years later with the result that the indus-
try had become a three-company oligopoly by the 1970s. Phase 4 extending
from 1985 to the present has seen the industry turn into a duopoly. In 1985
Cuauhtémoc began moves which led to the absorption of Moctezuma after it
fell into financial distress because of its foreign debt problem. This has left
Modelo as Cuauhtémoc’s only nationwide competitor.
Fig. 2-1.  Trend of Beer Production, 1925–84
              Source: INEGI (1985, vol. 2, pp. 503–4).
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The Formative Stage: 1890–1929
Cuauhtémoc was the first modern brewer in Mexico and took the lead in
establishing a modern beer brewing industry in the country. Following the
company’s establishment in 1890, major firms which were to play important
roles in the development of the industry were established one after another.
These included Moctezuma which was established in 1896 in the state of
Veracruz by a German citizen named Guillermo Hasse, and Cervecería de
Sonora established also in 1896 in the state of Sonora by a German named
Jacob Schele. In 1900 Schele sold Cervecería de Sonora and established in
the state of Sinaloa a brewery that later became Cervecería del Pacífico. In
the same year, P. Cámara, a Mexican national, established Cervecería Yucateca
in the state of Yucatán (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990, p. 19), and in 1925 a
group of immigrants from Spain, which included Braulio Iriarte, established
Modelo in Mexico City. Cuauhtémoc and the other breweries established
during this period had the following characteristics. First, foreigners or im-
migrants played important roles in launching these early breweries. They
contributed greatly to the development of the Mexican beer brewing indus-
try by transferring advanced technologies from Europe and the United States.
Second, these firms were local producers in the sense that each of them ca-
tered primarily to the local market in its vicinity. There was no company
having more than one production base until 1929 when Cuauhtémoc pur-
chased a firm in Mexico City.
Cuauhtémoc’s Nationwide Expansion: 1929–57
Cuauhtémoc gained a foothold in Mexico City in 1929 with the purchase
of Cervezas la Central. Then during the 1930s it tried to take over Moctezuma,
but the buyout negotiations fell through (Hamilton 1983, p. 286). In 1945 it
expanded into the state of Veracruz, the homeground of Moctezuma, by pur-
chasing Cervecería de Nogales which also operated in the state. In 1953
Cuauhtémoc bought out Cervecería de Humaya in the state of Sinaloa. In
1954 the company also took over Cervecería Tecate in the state of Baja Cali-
fornia Norte, as well as Cervecería Occidental in Guadalajara, the state of
Jalisco, in which it already had a partial shareholding (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc
1990, pp. 53–67). Through these takeovers, Cuauhtémoc had established it-
self as a national producer by the mid-1950s.
A comparison of the volume of beer produced by various enterprise groups
in 1955, shown in Table 2-1, reveals the following points. First, already in
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TABLE 2-1
BEER PRODUCTION OF VARIOUS BREWERIES, 1955
             Brewery                 Output       %                              Remarks
Cervecería Cuauhtémoc:
Monterrey Plant 113,420 16.6
D.F. (Mexico City) Plant 62,831 9.2 Purchased in 1929 by Cuauhtémoc
Nogales Plant 12,326 1.8 Purchased in 1945 by Cuauhtémoc
Cervecería de Humaya 9,535 1.4 Purchased in 1953 by Cuauhtémoc
Tecate Plant 15,701 2.3 Purchased in 1954 by Cuauhtémoc
Guadalajara Plant 13,493 2.0 Purchased in 1954 by Cuauhtémoc
Subtotal 227,306 33.3
Cervecería Moctezuma 154,664 22.7
Cervecería Modelo 210,310 30.8
Arrendataria de la
Cervecería Juárez 7,841 1.1 Purchased in 1965 by Cuauhtémoc
Cervecería Cruz Blanca 4,296 0.6 Purchased by Cuauhtémoc, date unknown
Cervecería Sabinas 6,193 0.9 Disappeared by 1971
Cervecería de la Laguna 7,704 1.1 Disappeared by 1971
Subtotal 26,034 3.8
Cervecería del Pacífico 18,016 2.6 Purchased by Modelo in the period 1965–71
Cervecería Yucateca 13,950 2.0 Purchased by Modelo in the period 1965–71
Cervecería del Norte 8,081 1.2 Purchased by Moctezuma by 1957
Cervecería La Estrella 3,941 0.6 Disappeared by 1963
Cervecería de Mexicali 12,402 1.8 Disappeared by 1971
Cervecería de Sonora 7,533 1.1 Disappeared by 1971
Cervecería de Tijuana 193 0.0 Disappeared by 1971
Subtotal 64,116 9.4
  Total 682,430 100.0
 Source: By the author based on data from Estrada (1957, pp. 150–51).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1955 the beer brewing industry was approaching a state of oligopolistic con-
trol by the three largest companies which together accounted for 86.8 per
cent of the total production. Second, among the big three, Cuauhtémoc en-
joyed the largest share, with the breweries acquired after 1929 contributing
half of the company’s production, indicating that corporate takeovers were
instrumental in boosting Cuauhtémoc’s market share. Third, at the time both
Modelo and Moctezuma had only one brewing plant each, in Mexico City
and the state of Veracruz respectively, but their shares of production were a
high 30.8 per cent and 22.7 per cent respectively. The two companies were
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able to attain large production volumes because they were located in densely
populated areas where large markets were readily available. A fourth point is
that all the companies other than the big three were small in size with indi-
vidual production shares of less than 3 per cent at the most.
Figure 2-2, which compares market shares of the big three on a state-by-
Fig. 2-2.  Big Three’s Market Shares in Various States, 1955
          Source: By the author based on Estrada (1957, p. 121).
          Note: The figures indicate the year of establishment or acquisition.
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Fig. 2-3.  Population Growth in the Big Three’s Major Markets, 1921–90
Source: INEGI (1994, vol. 1, pp. 16–25).
Note: Modelo’s main markets consisted of Mexico City, and the states
of México, Guanajuato, and Querétaro; Moctezuma’s consisted of
the states of Veracruz, Puebla, Hidalgo, and Tlaxcala; and
Cuauhtémoc’s consisted of the states of Nuevo León, Tamaulipas,
and Coahuila.
state basis in 1955, shows how the markets were divided among them at the
time. Cuauhtémoc took up more than 50 per cent of the market in the north-
eastern states of Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Coahuila; Modelo dominated
the central part of the country which included Mexico City, the states of
México, Guanajuato, and Querétaro; while Moctezuma was strongest in the
states of Veracruz, Tlaxcala, Puebla, and Hidalgo close to the Gulf of Mexico.
It is possible to say that Cuauhtémoc had the northeastern part of the country
under its sphere of influence, Modelo the central part, and Moctezuma the
states near the Gulf of Mexico. Figure 2-3 compares changes over time in the
population of the major market areas served by the three companies. It is
immediately evident from the figure that the total population of the three
states within Cuauhtémoc’s sphere of influence was much smaller than that
in the spheres of influence of its two rivals. In other words, it was imperative
for Cuauhtémoc, with its market much smaller than those of its two rivals, to
secure production bases in other locals in order to keep growing. It thus ad-
vanced first into Mexico City, which was part of Modelo’s sphere of influ-
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ence and also a superbly large market promising to grow rapidly, and then
into the state of Veracruz, which constituted Moctezuma’s sphere of influ-
ence and which was also deemed to be a very promising market. It should be
noted that Figure 2-2 indicates that there were areas not under the influence
of any of the big three, notably the northern area along the Pacific Coast (the
states of Sinaloa and Baja California Sur) and the Yucatán Peninsula (the
states of Yucatán and Campeche). The former area was the territory of
Cervecería del Pacífico which controlled 50.2 per cent of that regional mar-
ket, while the latter was dominated by Cervecería Yucateca with an 81.3 per
cent share of the market (Estrada 1957, p. 121). Later, however, these two
areas were incorporated into the spheres of influence of the big three.
Modelo and Moctezuma Expansion into Provincial Markets: 1957–85
Table 2-2 summarizes the evolution of enterprise groups in the Mexican
beer brewing industry from the 1950s until the late 1980s. Let us use this
table and look into the development of enterprise groups since 1957. In the
latter half of the 1950s, both Modelo and Moctezuma began to expand ag-
gressively. Moctezuma began when in or around 1957 it took over Cervecería
del Norte located in Monterrey, the home ground of Cuauhtémoc. This move
was followed in 1961 by Modelo which established a subsidiary company,
Cervecería Modelo de Noroeste, in the state of Sonora, and another subsid-
iary, Cervecería Modelo de Guadalajara, in Guadalajara city in the state of
Jalisco. Subsequently in 1966 Modelo established a subsidiary, Cervecería
Modelo de Torreón, in the state of Coahuila, while purchasing Cervecería
del Pacífico and Cervecería Yucateca, mentioned above. This expansion
pushed Modelo’s influence into Cuauhtémoc’s territory (the state of Coahuila
and the city of Guadalajara), and also into areas previously untouched by the
big three, namely, the northern area along the Pacific Coast and the Yucatán
Peninsula. Cuauhtémoc responded to its rivals’ offensives by opening a coun-
teroffensive. In 1965 Cuauhtémoc took over Arrendataria de la Cervecería
Juárez located in the state of Chihuahua, and toward the end of the 1960s, it
established in the state of México a new brewery equipped with the most
advanced technologies. In the early 1970s Moctezuma built a brewery in
Guadalajara, giving each of the big three a brewery in the country’s second
largest city. Meanwhile, Modelo established a subsidiary, Cía. Cervecería
Tropico, in the state of Oaxaca, thereby strengthening its competitive posi-
tion in the southern market. As the three largest beer brewing companies
expanded their production networks across the country by penetrating into
each other’s sphere of influence, smaller firms disappeared one after another.
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37OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND ENTERPRISE INNOVATION
Underlying the rapid increase in beer production taking place in Mexico
was a favorable turn in market conditions brought about by a rapid increase
in the urban population and expanding national income. However, such a
favorable turn in market conditions only meant that the potential market was
expanding. Turning the potential market into a real market required action
on the part of the beer producers. Let us look at the growth of Cuauhtémoc to
see what action was taken.
The Growth and Innovation of Cuauhtémoc
Cuauhtémoc was founded in 1890 in Monterrey in the state of Nuevo León
close to the border with the United States. Its founding came out of a pro-
posal by an American named Joseph Schnaider who was a member of a beer
brewing family in the United States. Schnaider’s business was importing
beer into Mexico, and he made his proposal to a merchant at Casa Calderón
y Cía. which was very prosperous commercial house in Monterrey at the
time. Isaac Garza took the lead in the firm’s establishment becoming its first
president, while Schnaider took charge of production. Along with these two,
Francisco Sada, José Muguerza, and José Calderón contributed initial capi-
tal. All the contributors of funds other than Schnaider were related by blood
or by marriage. In 1894 Francisco G. Sada, another kinsman of the Mexican
founding families, joined the company as its general manager (Naranjo 1955,
p. 29). Schnaider sold his shares in the company in 1897, and thereafter it
developed as a family-controlled business (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990,
pp. 23, 26). The company’s growth was characterized by its active adoption
of new technologies, its energetic pursuit of policies to internalize produc-
tion of raw materials and to geographically expand its network for the pro-
duction of these materials, and its emphasis on the formation of its own dis-
tribution network and on advertising.
The Adoption of New Technologies
The major beer brewing companies in Mexico have shown keen interest in
introducing advanced technologies from abroad for beer brewing
(Departamento de Estudios Económicos de Banco Nacional de Comercio
Exterior 1973, p. 580). What is salient about the growth of Cuauhtémoc,
moreover, is that it has energetically sought to improve not only the technol-
ogy for beer production but also that for manufacturing containers and pack-
ages.
One improvement in containers, in addition to conventional bottled beer,
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was the production of barreled beer which Cuauhtémoc produced for the
first time in Mexico in 1893. In 1903 the company introduced metal bottle
caps to replace cork caps which it had been using previously. Bottle caps had
begun to come into wider use in the United States following their invention
there in 1892, and Cuauhtémoc was among the earlier companies in the world
to start using them. Other bottle cap innovations introduced by Cuauhtémoc
included the development in 1967 of a “quitapon,” a cap which can be opened
without using a bottle opener, and the development in 1969 of a “quita-
quitapon,” a beer bottle equipped at its bottom with a bottle-opening func-
tion. Regarding container materials, Cuauhtémoc replaced wooden barrels
with metal barrels in 1930; in 1953 it started using brown bottles to prevent
change in the quality of beer; and in 1954 it started producing canned beer.
The existence of the affiliated steel company Hylsa, to be described in greater
detail in another chapter, made it possible for Cuauhtémoc to adopt cans at
an early date even by world standards. Cuauhtémoc’s efforts to improve pack-
ages began in 1892 when it started replacing wooden barrels with wooden
boxes, which work better for transportation and storage. During the 1920s
wooden boxes were replaced by cardboard boxes, and the package size was
reduced from sixty bottles per box to twenty-five. The reduced size and weight
of a unit package went a long way toward making transportation faster and
safer, and toward reducing costs and storage space. The company started
using a six-bottle carton in 1960, plastic cases in 1971, and refrigerator tank
lorries in the early 1980s (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990, pp. 31, 50, 70–71,
76; Naranjo 1955, p. 38; Fuentes Mares 1976, p. 135).
Improvements in containers and packages enhanced product convenience,
prevented quality deterioration, reduced transportation costs, and added nov-
elty to the products. These benefits helped the company improve its cost
competitiveness, and differentiate its products from those of its rivals and
thus attract consumers.
Internalized Production of Raw Materials and Geographical Expan-
sion of Production
Cuauhtémoc also took the lead in internalizing the production of raw ma-
terials, one of the salient features of the Mexican beer brewing industry.
Cuauhtémoc’s internal production system began with the production of beer
bottles. In 1899 the company’s founders and other influential merchants in
Monterrey put up funds to establish a company for manufacturing beer bottles
domestically and replace imported bottles. Problems such as the company’s
use of the unreliable hand blowing method, high costs of production, and
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difficulties in the procurement of raw materials led to its bankruptcy in 1903,
but it was reestablished in 1909 as a new company named Vidriera Monterrey.
The investors in the earlier company were joined in the launch of the new
beer bottle manufacturing company by a group of entrepreneurs licensed to
use in Mexico the patent for an automatic bottle making machine, developed
by Owens, a U.S. company. The use of the automatic bottle making machine
to replace the hand blowing method helped get the new company’s produc-
tion off the ground. Along with the geographical expansion of beer produc-
tion, there was a similar expansion in the production of beer bottles. In 1934
Vidriera México, a subsidiary of Vidriera Monterrey, was established in
Mexico City to preempt a plan by Moctezuma and a soft-drink maker to
jointly establish a bottle manufacturing plant. In 1944 Vidriera Monterrey
established another subsidiary, Vidriera Los Reyes, in the state of México,
and in 1951 it purchased Vidriera Guadalajara, a glass bottle manufacturer in
Guadalajara. Keeping pace with the geographical expansion of the beer bottle
production, Vidriera Monterrey’s glass manufacturing also diversified. In the
1920s and 1930s it set up Vidrio Plano, a subsidiary specializing in the pro-
duction of flat glass, and Cristalería, another subsidiary specializing in the
production of crystal glass. In 1943 it established Fabricación de Máquinas,
a subsidiary for manufacturing molds, machines, and parts for the produc-
tion of glass products. This was followed by the establishment of Materias
Primas Monterrey in the early 1950s, a subsidiary for mining mineral mate-
rials for glass production (Barragán and Cerutti 1993, pp. 183–84, 190;
González Garza 1994, pp. 95, 99, 101–2).
In 1920 Cuauhtémoc established Fábricas Monterrey, a subsidiary to un-
dertake the internal production of bottle caps and cartons (Cervecería
Cuauhtémoc 1990, p. 49). Previously Cuauhtémoc had imported bottle caps.
But even after the launching of its own cap manufacturing, Fábricas Monterrey
had to depend on foreign supplies of steel sheets, the raw material for bottle
cap manufacturing. In 1936 the carton manufacturing division of Fábricas
Monterrey was reorganized into an independent subsidiary, Empaques de
Cartón Titán. This company in turn established a subsidiary in Monterrey in
1946 that specialized in the production of kraft paper and cardboard. In the
early 1950s Empaques de Cartón Titán started the geographical expansion of
its production facilities, establishing a plant in Mexico City in 1951, and
another in Guadalajara in 1952 (Barragán 1991, pp. 31, 35, 38).
In 1929 Cuauhtémoc started the internalized production of malt instead of
importing it from Europe and the United States. A malt producing division
was added to the above-mentioned Fábricas Monterrey; then in 1936 the
division became the independent subsidiary Malta (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc
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1990, p. 56). As of 1955 Cuauhtémoc had malt producing plants in Monterrey,
Mexico City, and the state of Baja California Norte. At early stages of
Cuauhtémoc’s internal production of malt, it used imported barley, the raw
material for malt production. But the company took steps to encourage local
farmers to grow barley suited for beer production by guaranteeing the pur-
chase of their crops and by distributing imported seeds of high-yielding vari-
eties. Consequently by the 1950s it was able to procure barley locally (Naranjo
1955, pp. 58–59). To procure this barley, the company’s beer sales agents (to
be mentioned later) began to double as middlemen to purchase barley
(Medellín 1980, p. 930).
The suspension of imports of steel sheets during World War II pushed
Cuauhtémoc to internalize the production of steel sheets for use in the manu-
facturing of bottle caps. A new subsidiary, Hylsa, was established in 1942 to
undertake this internal production. (Hysla will be discussed at length in Chap-
ter 3.) Cuauhtémoc established a label-printing subsidiary, Grafo Regia, in
1957, and a plastic products manufacturing subsidiary, Plásticos Técnicos
Mexicanos, in 1975; in both cases, the company reorganized its manufactur-
ing divisions into independent subsidiaries (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990,
p. 69; Industridata, empresas grandes 1985–86). In 1936, in its efforts to
save on taxes and deal effectively with its rapidly growing number of its
subsidiaries, Cuauhtémoc restructured itself by establishing the holding com-
pany VISA and concentrating its shares in the subsidiaries under this holding
company.
Cuauhtémoc’s active pursuit of its policy to internally produce various
raw materials can be explained by the following advantages of such produc-
tion. First, internalized production had the advantage of ensuring stable sup-
plies of raw materials. Before they began to be produced internally, many of
the raw materials had been imported, and thus had been subject to sudden
price increases or supply stoppages caused by fluctuations in foreign ex-
change rates, outbreaks of wars, and other factors. By switching to internal
production, the company could expect to procure raw materials at stable prices
and on a continuous basis. Second, internal production had the effect of boost-
ing the company’s competitiveness. Internally produced raw materials were
not only used internally, but were sold to other companies (Naranjo 1955, p.
61). In a situation where the number of domestic suppliers was limited, it
was often possible for producers of raw materials to manipulate prices and
supplies as they pleased. It is thus plausible to assume that by procuring raw
materials on conditions advantageous to the company, Cuauhtémoc must have
gained a competitive edge over its rivals. Third, many lines of business which
the company expanded into as part of its effort at internalizing production
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had promising futures themselves. Many of the subsidiaries established by
Cuauhtémoc as a means of procuring raw materials internally were the first
modern enterprises established in Mexico in their respective fields. More-
over, given the fact that these subsidiaries were assured of Cuauhtémoc’s
very reliable market, they constituted very sound and lucrative investments,
and many of them later grew into major enterprises in their respective fields.
To compete with Cuauhtémoc, its rivals also embarked on the internaliza-
tion of raw material production. Modelo started producing malt in 1929, beer
bottles in 1935, and cardboard in 1954, all in Mexico City. It also established
a carton producing subsidiary in 1959, and a bottle manufacturing subsidiary
in 1968, both in the state of México (Cordero and Santín 1977, pp. 36–37;
Industridata, empresas grandes 1991). Moctezuma established its own malt
producing subsidiary in 1957, and completed systems for the internal pro-
duction of beer bottles and cardboard by 1962 (Pineda Gurrión 1963, p. 48).
Cuauhtémoc’s Distribution Network and Advertising Activities
As the potential market for beer expanded rapidly in response to Mexico’s
rapid urbanization and rising income levels, companies had to find ways to
transform this potential market into a real one. And it was their efforts to
expand distribution networks and advertise aggressively that proved instru-
mental in bringing about this transformation. Since documents describing
Cuauhtémoc’s performance in these areas during the mid-1950s are unavail-
able, the discussion in this subsection will focus on the developments in the
beer brewing industry as a whole. It is plausible to assume, nonetheless, that
many of the features of the industry in distribution and advertising at this
time would have primarily reflected Cuauhtémoc’s activities.
In the mid-1950s, as much as 75 per cent of total beer shipments was
transported by road, and the three largest beer brewing companies owned
fleets of trucks and trailers. They divided the entire country into several dis-
tricts, establishing a warehouse in each district. Marketing activities in each
district were undertaken by sales agents. Qualifications required of would-
be sales agents differed from one company to another. In some cases would-
be sales agents were required to have certain amounts of business funds; in
other cases these funds were lent by the brewing company; and in yet other
cases, sales agents were required to deposit certain sums of money as secu-
rity to cover the costs of the products and containers they handled. The beer
brewers provided services, such as granting retail stores the use of refrigera-
tors free of charge or providing them with ice. In Mexico City, the most
important market, the major companies maintained direct distribution sys-
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tems of their own. They maintained staffs of employees responsible for the
distribution of their products in the city, and assigned each vehicle with a
specific area of distribution. The costs of distribution, including the costs of
maintaining vehicles and fuel costs, were borne by the companies, while the
employees engaged in distribution were paid, in addition to their wages, com-
missions in proportion to the volumes of their sales (Estrada 1957, pp. 111–
18; Pineda Gurrión 1963, pp. 61–62; Departamento de Estudios Económicos
de Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior 1973, p. 581; Medellín 1980, p.
930). Beginning in the 1980s, however, the major brewing companies ex-
panded these direct distribution systems across the country. In the case of
Cuauhtémoc, it switched to the practice of distributing all its products through
its own, direct distribution system by 1990 (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990,
p. 83).
Cuauhtémoc has put special emphasis on advertising since its establish-
ment, employing a wide variety of methods such as exhibiting its products at
international trade fairs (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990, pp. 31, 36), placing
advertisements in newspapers and magazines, running spot advertisements
on radio and television and in movie theaters, sponsoring radio and televi-
sion programs, distributing posters and leaflets, placing billboards, sponsor-
ing various social events, and distributing advertisement gifts (Estrada 1957,
pp. 77–78). With the spread of mass media, the geographical reach of advert-
ing activities expanded rapidly (NAFIN 1971, p. 162). The major beer com-
panies tried hard to win over drinkers of “pulque,” the agave-based indig-
enous liquor that is a formidable competitor of beer. They actively disseminated
the image of “beer as a modern beverage,” trying to urge consumers to change
their taste. At the same time, the three largest beer brewers vied strenuously
with each other for new customers by repeatedly hammering the brand names
of their respective products into the minds of consumers, and trying to nur-
ture consumer allegiance to their own brands. As a result of these aggressive
advertisement campaigns, which both expanded and enhanced the market,
the consumption of beer increased much faster than the increase in in-
come.
The Split-up of VISA
For decades after 1938, when Francisco G. Sada resigned as general man-
ager, two sons of Isaac Garza, Eugenio Garza Sada and Roberto Garza Sada,
were jointly at the helm of VISA’s operations. Then in 1973 Eugenio was
assassinated by a leftist guerrilla group. Following his death, a dispute erupted
over the question of who should be his successor (Proceso, April 21, 1986, p.
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20), and this led to the split-up of VISA in 1974 (Cordero and Santín 1977, p.
29). In that year, two of VISA’s subsidiaries, Hylsa and Empaques de Cartón
Titán separated themselves from VISA’s control and became affiliated with
Grupo Industrial Alfa, a holding company which was established in the same
year under the management of Roberto’s son, Bernardo Garza Sada. Mean-
while, VISA was left with Cuauhtémoc and a host of other subsidiaries, in-
cluding Fábricas Monterrey, Malta, Grafo Regia, and Plásticos Técnicos
Mexicanos. Eugenio Garza Lagüera, a son of Eugenio, took control of VISA’s
management. After the split, VISA began diversifying its operations, but it
became caught up in the foreign debt problem during the 1980s and had to
liquidate or sell off many of its new ventures. Among the new business un-
dertakings launched after 1974, only two divisions, the cola division and the
convenience chain store division, are still in existence. The two divisions
work closely with the beer brewing division in the use of the distribution
network and raw materials. Subsequently, VISA acquired Moctezuma, an
acquisition that proved very significant not only because it boosted
Cuauhtémoc’s market share, but also because VISA acquired Moctezuma’s
raw material producing subsidiaries which enabled Cuauhtémoc to reestab-
lish its system for the internalized production of raw materials which had
been weakened following the transfer of some subsidiaries to Alfa.
Concluding Remarks: Enterprise Innovativeness, Competition, and
Industrialization
Throughout the history of the Mexico’s beer brewing industry, Cuauhtémoc
has always spearheaded its development, and at the same time has been the
driving force behind the industry’s transformation into an oligopoly. The
company has been able to play such a leadership role because of its
innovativeness which it has displayed in the introduction of new technolo-
gies, in embarking on the internalized production of raw materials, in ex-
panding its distribution network, and in its aggressive advertising campaigns.
It has vigorously pursued these undertakings because they have served as
effective means of ensuring Cuauhtémoc’s growth. To a large extent such
effectiveness has been dictated by the characteristics of the Mexican beer
brewing industry and the course of industrialization in Mexico.
Standardization of technology for beer brewing has made it easy for
Cuauhtémoc to introduce advanced technologies. Introduction of advanced
technologies has proved instrumental in reducing production costs, improv-
ing product quality, and differentiating the company’s products from those
of its competitors, thereby giving it a competitive edge over its rivals. One
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peculiar feature of the beer brewing industry is that while its technological
barriers to new entrants are not prohibitive, it readily gives rise to the con-
centration of production, and once production becomes concentrated, it is
very difficult for new entrants to break into the industry. There are several
reasons for this. First, as a highly mechanized industry, beer brewing indus-
try is subject to the rule of economies of scale. Since a company which man-
ages to gain economies of scale can readily outperform its competitors with
its lower costs of production, companies are often very eager to expand the
scale of their operations. Second, once the scale of production is expanded,
the increased production capacities call for the corresponding expansion of
distribution networks, and the expanded distribution networks work as barri-
ers to new entrants. Third, beer’s nature as a mass consumption good allows
industry players to nurture consumer allegiance to brand names by staging
aggressive advertisement campaigns. And the existence of established brands
in the industry also works as a barrier to new entrants. In other words, for any
company hoping to remain competitive in the industry, it is imperative to
expand its production capacity, improve its distribution network, and estab-
lish its brand name; and once a company that has fulfilled these requirements
emerges, the fulfillment of these requirements turns into a barrier to entry.
Cuauhtémoc moved ahead of its competitors in meeting these requirements.
And this fact, in turn, has given the company a competitive edge over its
rivals, making it the leader in the industry and in pushing forward the pro-
cess of oligopolization.
Intense inter-company competition in the beer brewing industry prompted
Cuauhtémoc to produce raw materials internally. Before it embarked on such
production, many of the raw materials had been imported because of the
absence in Mexico of competent producers capable of supplying materials of
good quality at appropriate prices and on a stable basis. Internalized produc-
tion of raw materials offered the company advantages of securing stable sup-
plies of raw materials, reducing production costs, and boosting its competi-
tive position. Cuauhtémoc was the first to launch these internalized operations
in Mexico, and they had good business potentials of their own. In all likeli-
hood these advantages must have inspired Cuauhtémoc to undertake the in-
ternal production of raw materials. In effect the lag in Mexico’s industrial-
ization led Cuauhtémoc to take up the internal production of raw materials,
and these internal undertakings, in their turn, had the effect of pushing the
process of Mexico’s industrialization forward.
At the same time, inter-company competition was also dictated by the
state of industrialization in Mexico. First, the development of industrializa-
tion caused the urban population and people’s incomes to increase at faster
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rates than previously which caused a correspondingly rapid expansion in the
potential market for beer. The growth in latent demand also created a new
arena for inter-company competition. Second, improvements in road networks
and the spread of mass media that accompanied the industrialization process
enabled companies to improve and expand their distribution networks, and
stage advertisement campaigns more effectively. In other words, the advance
of industrialization had the effect of enhancing the means of competition.
Cuauhtémoc’s two latecomer rivals were compelled to adopt the same means
as Cuauhtémoc in order not to be left behind, namely, geographical expan-
sion of their production networks, internalized production of raw materials,
expansion of their distribution networks, and active use of advertising. As
they followed Cuauhtémoc’s example, production became all the more con-
centrated, and competition grew ever more intense. Since the measures
adopted in order to fulfill the requisites for corporate growth became the
means of competition, and since the adoption of these means was dictated by
the characteristics of the Mexican beer brewing industry and by the state of
Mexico’s industrialization, it was inevitable that the industry grew into an
oligopoly.
One important factor explaining Cuauhtémoc’s innovativeness was the
quality and capability of its managers. Such quality and capability is espe-
cially important for a family-controlled enterprise where managerial power
tends to be concentrated in its owner-manager. In this respect, Cuauhtémoc
was blessed with competent managerial talent. No less important is the en-
trepreneurial atmosphere of Monterrey which has been conducive to nurtur-
ing people of superb managerial talent. Located approximately 150 kilome-
ters from the border with the United States, the city has had close economic
and cultural contacts with the United States for centuries. Monterrey’s his-
torical role as a contact point between two economic worlds, the industrially
advanced United States and the late-industrializing Mexico, has given the
city an atmosphere where prospective businesses can be easily discovered,
up-to-date information on economics and technology are readily accessible,
and personal ties with the American business community can be easily forged.
These characteristics of the city have enabled ambitious entrepreneurs to rise
to the challenges posed by venture undertakings of uncertain prospects. In
this respect, immigrants from economically advanced countries, wherever
they settled in Mexico, were positioned at the point of contact between two
different economic worlds, and in this sense were in situations similar to
entrepreneurs in Monterrey. Given the economic significance of immigrants,
it is no surprise that Cuauhtémoc’s arch-rival, Modelo, was founded by a
group of immigrants from Spain.
